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 Abstract 
The notion of a European social model assumes that European societies have certain 
features in common which distinguish them positively from the United States, among 
them most notably the social partnership in labour relations, redistributive welfare state 
schemes, and cohesive societies with a low degree of social inequality. The paper exam-
ines to what extent the social reality in the EU conforms to this normative image and 
what challenges imperil the sustainability of the European social model. Special atten-
tion is drawn to the influence of supranational decision-making in the European Union 
and to the role of the European Court of Justice. It is shown that Court rulings imperil 
the viability of national social programs, because they open the schemes to transnational 
access even though they continue to be nationally financed. This is also in tension with 
the solidarity concepts of European citizens which continue to be framed in terms of 
national citizenship. As a possible solution to these tensions, the strengthening of the 
participation rights of national parliaments and governments on the European level is 
advocated. 
Zusammenfassung 
Das Konzept des Europäischen Sozialmodells wird als normative Leitidee definiert, der 
zufolge die Europäische Union sich als „USA plus“ verstehen lässt. Während Schlüs-
selcharakteristika wie Marktwirtschaft, Demokratie und offene Gesellschaft Europa und 
die USA verbinden, haben europäische Gesellschaften darüber hinaus ihrem Anspruch 
nach aber einige Merkmale gemeinsam, die sie von den USA unterscheiden, nämlich 
die Sozialpartnerschaft, den umverteilenden Sozialstaat und den größeren gesellschaftli-
chen Zusammenhalt mit vergleichsweise geringer Ungleichheit. Untersucht wird, inwie-
fern diese normative Idee der empirischen Realität entspricht und welche Herausforde-
rungen die Nachhaltigkeit des europäischen Sozialmodells gefährden. Das besondere 
Augenmerk gilt hier dem Einfluss supranationaler Entwicklungen in der Europäischen 
Union und insbesondere der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs. Es wird 
gezeigt, dass die Rechtsprechung des EuGH häufig auf die transnationale Öffnung sozi-
aler Sicherungsprogramme hinausläuft, die aber nach wie vor nationalstaatlich finan-
ziert werden. Supranationale Entscheidungen auf EU-Ebene geraten damit zunehmend 
in Widerspruch mit nationalstaatlichen Institutionen sowie auch den Solidaritätsvorstel-
lungen europäischer Bürger, die nach wie vor an der nationalen Staatsbürgerschaft 
festmachen. Ein möglicher Lösungsmechanismus wird in der Stärkung der Mitsprache-
rechte nationaler Parlamente und Regierungen auf europäischer Ebene gesehen. 
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Introduction1 
The European Social Model is a concept which is poorly defined, but cherished by 
many who are concerned that it might be imperilled. In this contribution I will first de-
fine the European Social Model as a normative concept that is developed in contrast to 
the United States and claims that European societies have certain features in common 
which distinguish them from the U.S. In a second step I will briefly apply three criteria 
that help to determine to what extent the normative idea conforms to social reality. In a 
third step I will discuss three types of challenges that jeopardise the social dimension of 
Europe. The first two of these – external challenges resulting from globalization, and 
internal challenges resulting from demographic change and from the transition to post-
industrial labour markets – I will discuss only briefly. My focus will be on the third type 
of challenge resulting from supranational developments in the European Union and spe-
cifically from the roles played by the Commission and by the European Court of Justice. 
In a fourth and final step I will discuss the prospects for coping with the challenges 
through either strengthening supranational competences at the level of the EU or 
through revitalizing the role of national parliaments and governments. My argument is 
that there is a trend towards negative integration in the EU weakening national social 
policy functions which could only be counter-acted if there were a strong political will 
against it. Since such a strong will for countervailing supranational action can neither be 
found on the part of European elites nor on the part of national citizens, the only effec-
tive remedy consists in revitalizing the participation and the veto powers of national 
parliaments and governments in EU decision-making. This latter position is not only 
shared by many German scholars, but also by the German Constitutional Court in its 
2009 ruling on the compatibility of the law ratifying the Lisbon Treaty with the German 
Constitution.  
                                                 
1  This is the text of a lecture which was given at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, 
Prague, on 29 March 2010. 
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1. The normative idea of the European Social Model:  
Europe as “USA plus”  
The ’European Social Model’, though frequently referred to in politicians’ speeches, is 
rarely defined with any precision. One of the perhaps clearest attempts at an official 
definition may be found in the Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council 
meeting of 2000, where annex 1 describing the European Social Agenda states:  
 
’The European social model, characterised in particular by systems that offer a 
high level of social protection, by the importance of the social dialogue and by 
services of general interest covering activities vital for social cohesion, is to-
day based, beyond the diversity of the Member States’ social systems, on a 
common core of values’ (European Council, 2000b).   
Here we find four elements: (1) a high level of social protection with services of general 
interest; (2) the social dialogue, referring to coordinated policy making with collective 
agreements negotiated by the social partners; (3) an emphasis on social cohesion, and 
(4) a set of common core values. Official texts thus make it clear that the term European 
social model is to encompass more than a mere model of social policy. The documents 
rather make reference to embracive characteristics in the dimensions of state, economy, 
and society. Implicitly – and in more recent times also explicitly – the References term 
is often used to distinguish a European type of society from the type of society in the 
United States (cf. Albert, 1992).2  
It appears, then, that the idea of a European Social Model implies the normative no-
tion that the European Union should be conceived of as a ’USA plus‘, i.e. as a type of 
society which delivers everything the United States has to offer, but also some elements 
in addition which make a society worth living in and which the U.S. lack (Alber 2006) 
(figure 1). In the dimension of the economy, this means that Europe combines the 
growth dynamic of a market economy with the coordinating social dialogue of the col-
lective bargaining partners and with ecologically sustainable development. In the di-
mension of the state it means that European countries are not only free democracies, but 
also redistributing welfare states which supplement the market with a notion of social 
citizenship and a second sphere of the distribution of life chances that smoothes social 
inequalities. In the dimension of society in the more narrow sense, it finally means, that 
                                                 
2  References with a competitive edge to the United States may be found rather frequently in official EU 
documents (e.g. European Commission, 2004, 2005). A first, still more implicit example was con-
tained in the conclusions of the 2000 Lisbon European Council setting the strategic goal for the Un-
ion ’to become the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion‘ (European Council 2000a). 
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in addition to providing opportunities for the individual pursuit of happiness in a post-
industrial global society, European societies promote solidarity bonds between individ-
ual citizens which strengthen social cohesion. Anthony Giddens (2005) once captured 
the essence of this European superiority claim in a nutshell by stating that the European 
social model combines economic dynamism with social justice.   
 
 
Figure 1: The conception of the European Social Model as “USA plus”  
 
   
ECONOMY Dynamic market economy + Social dialogue and ecologically 
sustainable development 
   
   
STATE Democratic freedom  + Redistributing welfare state 
   
   
   
SOCIETY Individual opportunity  + Social cohesion/ security 
   
2. How does the normative idea conform to social reality? 
Three empirical criteria  
If the idea of a European Social Model has empirical substance, we should be able to 
detect three of its traces in reality: (1) European countries should be similar in having 
crucial elements of the model in common; (2) They should converge rather than diverge 
over time; (3) And they should not “Americanize” in the sense of becoming more simi-
lar to the U.S. Since I have dealt with these issues in detail elsewhere (Alber 2006, 
2010), I will only examine them here briefly in a cursory fashion.   
a)  How much homogeneity do we find within Europe?  
As we all know, the Eastern enlargement has considerably increased the socio-economic 
and cultural heterogeneity of the EU. GPD per capita in the richest country – Luxem-
bourg – is now almost seven times as high as in the poorest country (Bulgaria). Even 
with respect to key dimensions that are central to the European Social Model we find 
stunning diversity: 
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- The social expenditure ratios ranges from 30 % in Sweden to 12 % in Latvia (factor 
2.5). 
- The coverage ratio of collective bargaining agreements ranges from 15 % Lithuania 
to over 90 % in Austria and Slovenia (factor 6). 
- The relative income poverty rate ranges from 4 %  in Denmark to 16 % in Slovakia 
(factor 4). 
Perhaps even more important than the amount of considerable diversity is the fact that 
we also find two very different, yet similarly successful social models, i.e. the Atlantic 
Irish-British model with comparatively low social expenditure and weak regulation on 
the one hand and the Scandinavian model on the other. As I have shown elsewhere (Al-
ber 2006), both models are similarly dynamic with respect to population growth and 
employment growth despite of the fact that the Scandinavian countries have similarly 
high public and social expenditure ratios as the much less dynamic continental Euro-
pean countries. Here I want to briefly illustrate this with reference to three indicators 
which some consider the bright side, the gray side, and the dark side of the European 
Social Model: the social expenditure ratio expressing welfare state extension, the public 
revenue share showing the burden of financing public services, and the employment rate 
tapping labour market success. This also leads to the second criterion of the direction of 
change over time.   
b)  Is there convergence over time within Europe? 
With respect to one core feature of the European Social Model – high public social 
spending – we see that most European countries have indeed higher spending levels 
than the United States, but within Europe we see persistent clusters of diverse families 
of nations rather than increasing similarity (figure 2): 
- Scandinavian and continental European countries have similarly high social expendi-
ture ratios.3  
- The southern European countries witnessed a considerable catch-up process over the 
past decades, in other words there were no social dumping policies with a race to the 
bottom. 
- With respect to the new member states the evidence is more mixed: There was 
growth compared to the early 1990s, but decline in the most recent period. Hence the 
new Member States come closest to approximating the United States. 
                                                 
3  The sudden increase in Scandinavia in the early 1990s reflects the economic crisis following the 
collapse of the Soviet empire rather than an increase in social spending. 
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Figure 2: Gross social expenditure ratios by country groups 1980 to 2005
In percent of GDP. OECD data except for the Estern European countries (Eurostat)
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Source: OECD: Social Expenditure database, New member states: Eurostat  
High public revenues are the other side of the coin in developed welfare states. Figure 3 
confirms that there was no race to the bottom in recent years, but rather persistent cross-
national differences. The high level of public revenues in the Scandinavian and Conti-
nental European countries is mirrored by the much lower levels in Britain and Ireland 
and in the Central European New Member States. While all European countries stand 
clearly apart from the United States, the Central European countries have joined the 
Anglo-Irish pattern of a comparatively low level of taxation. We neither see signs of a 
general race to the bottom, nor convergence towards one joint model.  
Employment used to be the dark side of the European model with higher levels of 
unemployment and lower levels of economic activity than in the United States (Eich-
horst and Hemerijck 2009). Recent developments show, however, that Europe has been 
catching up with the U.S. and that there was a trend towards convergence at higher lev-
els of employment (figure 4). In this sense, the Lisbon strategy has born fruit, even 
though the Scandinavian and Western European countries still lead the Continental, 
Southern European, and Central European countries by wide margins of more than ten 
percentage points. The New Member States were able to catch up with the Southern 
European countries. 
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Figure 3: Development of general government revenue 1995 - 2008
In percent of GDP
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Figure 4: Development of the employment rate in Europe and the USA 1992 - 2008
In percent of population aged 15-64
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c)  Does Europe approximate the U.S. or vice versa?  
To the extent that the European Social Model(s) is/are viable, the U.S. should move 
closer up to European countries rather than European pursuing a downward trend ap-
proximating the U.S. As I have dealt with the question of an Americanization of Euro-
pean social policies in more detail elsewhere (Alber 2010), a few summary points may 
here suffice. In terms of total social expenditure the gap between the EU-15 and the 
U.S. has widened rather than shrunk between 1990 and 2005. With respect to private 
social spending, the share of private outlays increased in Europe, but as the growth was 
even steeper in the U.S., the gap separating the EU from the U.S. did not narrow. With 
respect to the policy discourse, there are some elements that might be described as 
Americanization in Europe – i.e. an emphasis on individual responsibility, on consumer 
choice, and on activation –, but also two elements of Europeanization in the U.S., as the 
U.S. are about to introduce a comprehensive health insurance scheme, while survey data 
suggest a growing acceptance of state responsibilities for redistribution over the past 
decades (see Alber 2010 for details). The sector-specific complexity of the changes does 
not suggest that any one model prevailed over the other or that overriding functional 
pressures pushed countries into one particular direction. If anything, path dependency – 
and perhaps co-convergence within families of nations – rather than convergence are the 
concepts which are most in line with the empirical data.4   
In sum, European countries do deviate from the U.S. in the sense of higher social 
spending and a higher GDP share of public revenues, but within Europe there is much 
diversity with different families of nations or different welfare regimes, and there is no 
convincing evidence for convergence or the development of one uniform social model 
in Europe. The question then is what challenges the European Social Model(s) have to 
cope with and to what extent differences distinguishing them in the social dimension 
from the U.S. will be sustainable in the future. In the following, I will briefly deal with 
two likely types of challenges that are frequently discussed in the welfare state litera-
ture, in order to then focus in more detail on a less likely challenge which has to do with 
EU politics. Problems pertaining to the mode of policy making in the EU have recently 
become the topic of intense debates in Germany. The content of these debates might be 
                                                 
4  This is very much in line with what other researchers have found. Starke, Obinger and Castles (2008) 
found catch-up processes rather than a race to the bottom, slightly growing revenue shares, a stability 
of de-commodification scores, and country-specific differences to the U.S. that increased rather than 
shrunk. Castles (2009) found neither convergence, nor U.S. exceptionalism, but rather impressive 
similarity among the English-speaking nations (i.e. the U.S., Britain, Ireland, Australia, and Canada, 
but not New Zealand). In his analysis, however, the U.S. stands out for its over-proportionate spend-
ing for external and internal security purposes which amounts to 14 % of social spending in Europe, 
but to 40 %  in the U.S. Castles also found that the gap separating single OECD-countries from the 
U.S. has grown rather than shrunk in the three dimensions he investigates: total social spending; 
spending on social services; and de-commodification. 
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of interest to the Czech Republic, since it also witnessed an intense debate about the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.  
3. Three types of policy challenges 
a)  External challenges from globalization   
A prominent argument maintains that globalization exerts a downward pressure on 
wages and taxes, as capital and jobs emigrate to cheap labour countries which put little 
regulatory or taxing demands on business (for a summary see Alber and Standing 2000; 
Hay 2006; for more details Geyer, Ingrebisten, Moses 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; 
Swank 2002). A counter-argument made by Graham Room (2002) and others contends 
that other factors weigh just as heavily on investment decisions as low wages or a low 
burden of taxation. Such factors include: 
- good governance ensuring property rights, 
- a well-developed infrastructure which lowers transportation costs and meets the de-
mands of the creative class (Florida 2002), 
- and a highly trained labour force which boosts productivity.  
Results of empirical analyses reflect this conceptual ambiguity. We have a host of 
analyses with slightly discrepant findings, but there seems to be growing consensus that 
globalization does not create any functional imperatives, but always interacts with do-
mestic structures which may me more or less adaptable to external pressures (Scharpf 
and Schmidt 2000; Swank 2002). A bivariate statistical analysis also illustrates that the 
relationship is not straightforward. The cross-sectional correlation between the level of 
world market integration as measured by the GDP share of imports and exports in 2005 
is zero (figure 5). The analysis of trends since 1980 shows that countries with a higher 
growth of international trade involvement had lower increases of social spending, but 
there are only four countries in which social spending shrank (figure 6). In all other 
cases, a stronger integration into the international economy merely led to a less steep 
growth of social expenditure. A more serious threat than globalization pressures proba-
bly results from internal challenges confronting the European Social Model. 
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Figure 5: Cross sectional relationship between world market integration and social expenditure 
levels, 2005
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Figure 6: Trends in world market integration and trends in social spending 1980 to 2005
(bs of trend line)
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b)  Internal challenges within nation-states  
The argument that internal challenges are paramount to globalization pressure has per-
haps been made most forcefully by Gösta Esping-Anderson in his books “Social Foun-
dations of Post-Industrial Economies” (1998) and his more recent “Why we need a new 
welfare state” (2002). The major point is that above all two processes undermine the old 
post-war social order: i.e. demographic change and the transformation of the labour 
force from industrial to post-industrial structures with much more female employment 
and much less continuous career patterns. 
With respect to demography two changes combine which lead to a serious threat to 
the sustainability of public pension schemes: the shrinking fertility rates and the greater 
longevity leading to growing proportions of elderly people. In combination, these proc-
esses lead to a steep growth in the old age dependency ratio which means that shrinking 
numbers of economically active people have to cater for growing numbers of elderly 
people. In the EU-25 there were about four economically active people per pensioner in 
2005, but there will only be two in 2050. Together with Germany, the Czech Republic 
belongs to those countries where the transformation is particularly profound (figure 7). 
In the labour market there were two changes with very important consequences for 
the pattern of labour relations in Europe: the change from industrial to post-industrial 
employment and the change from male to female employment. Industrial societies were 
male societies, the post-industrial service economy promises to become a female soci-
ety. In combination with the post-communist transition in Eastern Europe these changes 
led to a dramatic decline of unionisation and a threat to the European pattern of indus-
trial relations based on the idea of a social dialogue between business and labour (figure 
8). In some countries unionisation is now similarly low as in the US and the coverage of 
collective bargaining agreements is very low, especially in Eastern Europe. This is a 
good illustration of a point which is sometimes made: The eastern enlargement has 
shifted the center of gravity to the West, as the new member states are in many respects 
more similar to the English speaking countries, Britain, Ireland, and the United States. 
We first saw this pattern with respect to the revenue ratio (figure 3), and now see it 
again with respect to labour relations.5 
                                                 
5  These changes in the labour market have also entailed an  increasing inequality of income distribu-
tions which jeopardise the goal of social cohesion in EU Member States. The OECD publication 
“Growing Unequal? Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries” (2008) gives a very in-
structive comparative overview of these developments. Compared to the mid-1980s the income dis-
tribution of most OECD countries (with only 5 exceptions: FR, GR, IR, SP, TU) was much more un-
equal in the mid-2000s than in the mid-1980s. Most of this increase in inequality occurred from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, but in several countries - including Finland, Germany, Portugal, and 
Sweden - the trend continued after the mid-1990s. What is new in particular is the divergence of 
trends in the upper and lower quintiles of the income distribution. Austria and Germany are the two 
European countries which belong to the group of six countries including the USA in which the real 
household income of the bottom quintile decreased in real terms between the mid-1990s and mid-
2000s. 
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Figure 7: The number of economically active persons per pensioner, 2005 and 2050
(Population age 15-64 in relation to population 65+)
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Figure 8: Trade union density and collective bargaining coverage in Europe, 2006 (%)
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The internal transformation of demographic and labour market structures poses seri-
ous threats to the viability of generous welfare state schemes. However, there is a third 
challenge, which may sound less likely, but may be just as important. This is the chal-
lenge arising from the supranational decision making in the EU.  
c)  Supranational challenges on the level of the EU 
On the level of the EU there are four key actors: The Council, the European Parliament, 
the Commission, and the European Court of Justice. The European Parliament is not 
only too heterogeneous, but also too weak to shape the fate of the Union to similar de-
grees as the other actors, because it still lacks the full right to initiate legislative acts. 
Depending on the policy field, the Council acts either by unanimity, or by qualified or 
simple majority of its component members who represent the Member States (Article 
238 TFEU). In the field of social security and social protection of workers, Article 153 
TFEU still prescribes that “the Council shall act unanimously, in accordance with a spe-
cial legislative procedure, after consulting the European Parliament and the said Com-
mittees” (i.e the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions). 
Given the great diversity of national interests, reaching unanimity is extremely diffi-
cult.6 But even decisions by qualified majority would entail problems, because even 
governments who had voted against a legislative act in the Council would be compelled 
to enact it at home, thus facing a serious problem of legitimation vis-à-vis their national 
voters. In this context, the de-regulation of national provisions impeding the free 
movements of people or products proves to be a much easier task than the re-regulation 
required to harmonize diverse social policies. Whereas liberalization can be extended 
with little political visibility through actions of the Commission or the Court against 
infringements of the Treaty obligations, re-regulation depends upon the political agree-
ment of national governments and of different parliamentary factions with very diverse 
interests (Scharpf 1999: 50).7  
In Scharpf’s perception, the main beneficiary of supranational European law has 
been de-regulation or what he calls “negative integration”, because its basic rules were 
already contained in the primary law of the Treaties of Rome, whereas “positive integra-
tion” in the sense of re-regulating European social policy depends on the secondary law 
of agreements which national governments have to reach in the Council (Scharpf 1996: 
                                                 
6  As Scharpf (2009c) points out, the original six Common Market countries all represented social mar-
ket economies with similar Bismarck-type social security systems, whereas the later enlargements 
brought countries with very diverse socio-economic institutions into the club, thus rendering the task 
of finding consensus in social policy issues much more difficult. 
7  Scharpf (1999: 60) furthermore points out that Commission directives to abolish monopolies in tele-
communication markets can be adopted by a majority of commissioners without agreement of the 
Council. 
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15). Scharpf now sees the logic of European policy making shaped by “two institutional 
asymmetries: the first one favoring policy making by nonpolitical actors and impeding 
political action at the European level, and the second favoring negative integration and 
impeding specific policies of positive integration.” (Scharpf 2009c: 7). Policy making 
by political actors refers to the acts in which governments and the European Parliament 
have a voice. Non-political decisions are taken by the European Court of Justice (as 
well as by the European Central Bank) or by the Commission when it decides to prose-
cute certain practices of member states as violations of the Treaty. Once new legislation 
is adopted, it can only be abolished or adapted to changing circumstances or preferences 
if the Commission is willing to present a new initiative or if a blocking minority in the 
Council can be overcome (Scharpf 2009a: 7).8 Hence, European legislation is much less 
reversible than national legislation which may be adopted, amended and revoked at any 
time by simple parliamentary majorities (Ibid.).  
In the following, I will focus on the two major non-political actors on the European 
level identified by Scharpf, i.e. the Commission – which still has the monopoly of initi-
ating legislative proposals – and the European Court of Justice which has the monopoly 
of interpreting European law. Obstacles in the way of positive integration could only be 
partly neutralized if the key actors were united in a strong will to overcome them.  
With respect to the development of the European Social Model, the Commission has 
played a changing and inconsistent role over the years. If we look at our “USA plus” 
model, the Commission has sometimes put the emphasis on the “USA” element in the 
sense of stressing the growth and competitiveness as key properties that European so-
cieties should emulate, but sometimes it laid the emphasis on the “plus” element, high-
lighting the virtues of the European Social Model and the importance of social inclusion 
and cohesion.9  
There is a structural and a phase-specific element in the Commission’s wavering 
role. In terms of structure, different Directorates General focus on different issues. The 
DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities defines poverty as relative 
income poverty within a national framework, whereas the DG for Regional Policy aims 
at EU-wide social cohesion by defining cohesion as similarity or proximity to a Euro-
pean standard of living conditions. These different outlooks impede the development of 
a coherent European social policy approach.  
In addition, the Commission’s agenda has changed over time and been subject to 
phase-specific inconsistencies regarding the emphasis on specific policies. In the early 
1990s the Commission’s “Green Paper on European Social Policy” (European Commis-
                                                 
8  It remains to be seen to what extent the interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament 
and the Commission will effectively strengthen the role of legislative initiative requests made by Par-
liament.  
9  The British sociologist Ruth Levitas (1996) claims that the fight against social exclusion is merely 
symbolic politics which allow the neo-liberal approach of the Commission to be sold as a social pro-
ject. 
 
What – if anything – is undermining the European Social Model? 
 
 Page 20
sion 1993a) and “White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment” (Euro-
pean Commission 1993b) highlighted adverse effects of European social programmes, 
and called for the redirection of economic and social policies in the EU that would cur-
tail non wage-labour costs, and strengthen individual responsibility (Kuper 1994). The 
European Councils of Lisbon 2000 and Stockholm 2001 reiterated the importance of 
dynamic growth and competitiveness, of better education in a knowledge-based econ-
omy, and of activation programs which would increase labour force participation and 
boost the employment rate. 
The European Council meetings in Laeken 2001 and Barcelona 2002 then shifted to 
emphasising the virtues of social inclusion, called for national action plans which would 
promote and monitor progress in the fields of social inclusion and social protection and 
developed a set of social indicators (Laeken indicators) as well as education benchmarks 
for the measurement of progress in education (Barcelona).  
Based on the two Kok Reports of 2003 and 2004, the 2005 Review of the Lisbon 
Agenda then put the emphasis once again unequivocally on growth, competitiveness, 
and employment. The first Kok Report (Employment Taskforce 2003) was entitled 
“Jobs, Jobs, Jobs” and advocated “more investment in human capital” as the best way 
to social inclusion, the second one entitled “Facing the Challenge” (High Level Group 
2004) highlighted the importance of becoming economically fit to survive in the in-
creasingly competitive global economy.10 The Commission’s emphasis on unregulated 
markets reached its peak with the 2004 Bolkestein proposal for a Directive on services 
in the internal market. Departing from the principle of “freedom of establishment”, the 
proposal sought to give individuals or companies residing in Member States the right to 
provide a wide range of services in any other Member State based on the laws of the 
country of origin and freed from regulations in the host country. The proposal provoked 
massive resistance among those fearing a downward spiral of wages and quality stan-
dards, and lead to mass protests in Belgium, France, Denmark, and Sweden. The pro-
tests culminated in the defeat of the proposed European Constitution in referenda in 
France and the Netherlands in 2005. After the European Parliament had considerably 
modified the proposal, cancelling the country of origin principle and exempting certain 
services – such as health and social services – from the scope of the directive, the Com-
mission came up with a revised proposal that was passed in 2006 and went into effect in 
2009.  
                                                 
10  The shift of emphasis is highlighted by Graham Room (2008) who argued that the revised Lisbon 
agenda separated economic and social policies, tended to marginalise the latter, and gave priority to 
the goals of economic growth and competitiveness. It is true, however, that in some ways there was 
also a realization of some “plus”-elements in the “USA plus” equation: Minimum standards for the 
quality of work were frequently set by directives on the EU level, but not always implemented on the 
national level, where the New Member States are not necessarily slower in implementing EU regula-
tions (Falkner et al. 2005). The “social dialogue” is also in some respects further developed on the 
EU level than in some individual Member States.       
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It now remains to be seen to what extent the financial crisis and the recent difficulties 
faced by President Barroso in getting the European’s Parliament approval of his pro-
posed Commission will reshape the agenda of the new Commission. In a deal trading 
the Parliament’s confirmation of the new Commissioners for new institutional privi-
leges, an interinstitutional agreement between the Commission and the Parliament 
strengthened the latter’s role by a number of concessions, among them most notably 
three with implications for the social dimension of EU policies: (1) a strengthening of 
the right to initiate EU legislation by sending a legislative request to the Commission 
(Article 225 TFEU) to which the Commission now has to react within three months and 
must present a proposal within one year; (2) the right to be involved in legislative acts 
based on the social dialogue between management and labour; (3) the obligation of the 
Commission to complement new legislative proposals with a social impact analysis 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung 10. Februar 2010; European Parliament 2010).11  
In sum, there is considerable oscillation in the policies pursued by the Commission 
which at times gravitate more towards the social market model, emphasizing the plus 
side of the “USA plus” formula, but at other times more towards the “USA” side trying 
to emulate America by increasing economic competitiveness.  
The role of the other key actor – the European Court of Justice – has long been 
overlooked, but it has recently come under heavy attack, especially in Germany, from 
scholars, lawyers, and politicians alike. The importance of the Court stems from the fact 
that it has the sole power of giving legally binding interpretations of European law. 
Over the past decades the Court has issued some 7000 judgments interpreting European 
law in legally binding form some of which not only interpreted, but considerably devel-
oped and stretched the content of legislation (Höpner 2008, 2010). Recent German de-
bates have drawn attention to five critical aspects of the Court’s activities.  
First, Court decisions have established the primacy of EU law over national law in a 
fashion which is not explicitly contained in the EU treaties. The relevant first steps were 
taken in two  Court decisions of the early 1960s (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009/ 
BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08, paragraph 339). In Van Gend & Loos (C-26/62), the Court ruled in 
1963 that “the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights (...) Community law 
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon 
them rights which become part of their legal heritage.” One year later the Court con-
firmed in Costa/ENEL (6 /641) that “the Member States have limited their sovereign 
rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and them-
selves.” (...) “The law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could 
not because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provi-
sions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as community law and 
without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question.”  
                                                 
11  The second aspect was reported by the newspaper, but is not contained in the summary published by 
the European Parliament. 
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Second, departing from this basis, the Court has extended the competence of EU law 
far beyond the principles of conferral, of subsidiarity, and of proportionality which limit 
the supranational competences of the EU and dominate in the Treaties (Article 5 TEU). 
Some key judgments pertaining to social assistance and to labour legislation may illus-
trate this point. 
With respect to social assistance, it is clear that individual Member States can have 
no interest in inviting social raids (Kvist 2004) that would allow citizens from other 
Member States to exploit their national minimum income schemes which are financed 
from domestic tax payers. Hence there was general agreement that the right of residence 
for people without an occupational activity or for students must not become an unrea-
sonable burden on the public finances of the host Member State (Directive 90/364). For 
the specific case of students, Directive 93/96 regulated that the right of residence would 
hinge upon a declaration that the student has sufficient resources to avoid becoming a 
burden on the social assistance scheme of the host country.12  
In a number of cases the Court nevertheless ruled that citizens from other EU Mem-
ber States must have the same access to social assistance as citizens of the host country, 
because drawing distinctions based on nationality would amount to discrimination. In 
the Grzelczyk case (C-184/99), the Court ruled in 2001 that a French student living and 
studying in Belgium must have access to Belgian social assistance, as the right cannot 
be denied solely on the ground of nationality. It also ruled that the host Member State 
may reconsider the residence permit (par. 42), but may in no case deny the right simply 
because of the recourse to the host Member’s social assistance system (par. 43). In re-
lated cases – e.g. Trojani (C-456/02) – the Court reiterated this position, declaring that 
another French citizen has access to minimum subsistence in Belgium and that the right 
of residence cannot be denied simply on the grounds of the social assistance receipt. 
The latter aspect was later explicitly incorporated into Directive 2004/38/EC.  
In the field of labour relations the Court extended the reach of European Law even 
further beyond the legislative texts and the Treaties. Art. 153 TFEU stipulates that the 
Union shall merely “support and complement the activities of the Member States” in 
fields like “social security and social protection of workers”, and it explicitly declares in 
paragraph 5 that “the provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of asso-
ciation, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.” However, in the opinion of 
the Court this exemption does not preclude that such exempted rights must be recon-
ciled with the obligations imposed by Community law and the requirements relating to 
rights protected under the Treaty (Viking C-438/05, paragraphs 45-46). Hence in a 
number of rulings it declared collective action aiming at safeguarding national mini-
                                                 
12  Both directives were repealed in 2004 by Directive 2004/38/EC which strengthened the right of free 
movement within the EU, but still declared in paragraph 16: “As long as the beneficiaries of the right 
of residence do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Mem-
ber State they should not be expelled. Therefore, an expulsion measure should not be the automatic 
consequence of recourse to the social assistance system.” 
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mum standards of pay as incompatible with European law. The Laval and the Viking 
case are two famous cases in point. 
In its Laval judgment (C-341/05) the Court ruled that a Latvian construction firm 
building a public school in Sweden cannot be forced by means of collective action to 
enter into negotiations with the Swedish union on the rates of pay for its posted work-
ers. The Court argued that the firm had already signed collective agreements with the 
Latvian building sector’s trade union (paragraph 28), and that the Swedish national con-
text is characterised “by a lack of provisions which are sufficiently precise and accessi-
ble” (Summary, paragraph 4). Hence the Court ruled that collective action by the union 
was illegal, because it limited the company’s freedom to provide services with posted 
employees.   
In the Viking case (C-438/05) a Finnish trade union threatened with strike action 
against the plan of a Finnish ferry company to register its vessel Rosella in Estonia and 
to reach a collective agreement with the Estonian union. The Finnish union demanded 
to either give up this plan or to uphold the terms of the Finnish collective bargaining 
agreement regardless of the Rosella’s flag. While recognizing the right to strike as a 
fundamental right, the Court ruled that exercising it against the company in this case 
would restrict the company’s freedom of establishment and would therefore violate 
against European law.     
In the Rüffert case (C-346/06) the Court even went one step further by declaring a 
law passed by a German state parliament as incompatible with EU legislation. A state 
law of Lower Saxony stipulated that contractors for public works beyond a certain mag-
nitude must pay their workers at least the wage for which the collective agreement in 
force at the construction site provides. A German firm that had won the tender used a 
Polish firm as subcontractor which paid the workers less than one half of the minimum 
wage set in the collective agreement. The European Court of Justice ruled that an obli-
gation to comply with the prevailing collective agreements constitutes an impediment to 
market access for undertakings from other Member States and is therefore not compati-
ble with European law.    
In all these cases, the Court ruled that collective agreements which are not declared 
universally applicable cannot be considered to constitute a minimum rate of pay which 
Member States are entitled to impose on undertakings established in other Member 
States.13 Moreover, the Court also declared collective agreements or strike action to be 
illegal, even though the Treaty on the Function of the European Union explicitly ex-
empts the field of labour legislation with regard to pay or labour relations from the leg-
islative competence of the EU. 
The third criticism is that by granting non-nationals access to national social secu-
rity systems, Court rulings have recurrently decoupled the scope of beneficiaries of so-
cial protection schemes from the scope of their national financiers, thus destabilizing the 
fiscal solvency of national systems (Scharpf 2009b). Typical examples here include not 
                                                 
13  The Court here refers to Directive 96/71, see Rüffert, (C-438/5), paragraph 1 of the summary. 
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only the cases that opened access to national social assistance schemes cited above, but 
also the opening of transnational access to national public health care services or to pub-
lic universities. 
In the Watts case – C-372/04 – the Court ruled that the National Health Service of 
the UK must reimburse the hospital costs of a patient (Mrs. Watts) who jumped the 
NHS waiting list and went to Belgium to get surgery without prior authorisation of the 
NHS. Similar judgments with respect to health care were made in a series of other cases 
(e.g. Vanbraekel C-368/98; Smits and Peerbooms C-157/99; Müller-Fauré and Van 
Riet; C-358/99, Inizan C-56/01, Leichtle C-8/02). 
In the case of Watts the Court ruled that 
- the need for prior authorisation cannot be based merely on the existence of national 
waiting lists, but must be based on a medical assessment of the individual patient’s 
needs which shows that the delay arising from such waiting lists would not be unac-
ceptable; 
- the fact that the domestic health service provides services free of charge and may 
have to establish a special financial mechanism to satisfy the request for reimburse-
ment is no legitimate ground for the refusal of authorisation (paragraph 74); 
- the domestic institution must pay the medical costs pursuant to the provisions of the 
host country;14  
- it must hence reimburse the difference between the equivalent service in the home 
country and the actual medical costs incurred; 
- ancillary costs associated with the cross-border movement must be paid also in case 
the national system covers such costs for treatments occurring in the domestic hospi-
tal system. 
A similar Court ruling opened EU wide access to nationally financed universities. In 
Gravier (C-293/83) the Court ruled in 1985 that the imposition on students of other 
Member States of a charge, or a registration fee which is not imposed on students who 
are nationals of the host member state, constitutes discrimination and is hence unlawful. 
In Republic of Austria (C-147/03), the Court ruled in 2005 that Member States must 
take necessary measures to ensure that holders of secondary education diplomas 
awarded in other Member States have access to higher education under the same condi-
tions as domestic students. This meant that Austrian universities had to cope with a 
massive influx of German students who had failed to pass the numerus clausus require-
ments for access to medical studies at home, but could now move freely to Austrian 
universities (that had decided against similar numerus clausus restrictions). Austria’s 
                                                 
14  Here the Court went beyond the Kohll judgment (C- 158/96) which had opened access to ambulatory 
services in another Member State in 1998, but had limited the payment to the rates prevailing in the 
country of origin of the patient. 
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claim that this would jeopardise national planning and the financial equilibrium of the 
Austrian higher education system – because the number of students likely to register 
would outnumber the available places by far – did not convince the Court which held 
that there were no precise figures to sustain the claim (paragraphs 64-65). The Court 
concluded that national authorities that invoke a derogation from the fundamental prin-
ciple of movement for persons must “show in each individual case that their rules are 
necessary and proportionate to attain the aim pursued.” (Summary, paragraph 3).  
In all these judgments the Court clearly placed the individual right of unrestricted ac-
cess to services in all Member States over national concerns regarding the capacity for 
planning or the fiscal solvency of schemes. Opening transnational access to social bene-
fits that continue to be nationally financed is bound to create institutional disequilibria.15 
Such disequilibria will become prominent to the extent that the Commission succeeds in 
realizing its plans of moving geographical mobility in Europe closer to American levels 
(European Commission 2006, 2008; Commission of the European Communities 2007). 
While the Commission deplores “the weak mobility culture in the EU” (European 
Commission 2006: 6), it is the stickiness of Europeans to their home countries which 
presently prevents such disequilibria from becoming more pronounced and creating 
fiscal imbalances.  
The fourth criticism is that by claiming the primacy of European law the Court con-
tributes to legal uncertainty regarding the compatibility of national regulations with 
European law, because its rulings lack consistency. The inconsistency stems from two 
sources. First, judgments are usually made in separate chambers by different judges 
who serve for a renewable term of six years, as the Court sits in plenary session only in 
exceptional cases (defined in the treaties).16 The chambers mostly consist of three or 
five judges, in special cases also of a Grand Chamber with 13 judges.17 Each chamber 
elects its own president for a term of three years. The changing composition of the 
chambers is presumably a structural basis of the lack of consistency in Court decisions.  
The other reason is systematic. Court decisions typically weigh the proportionality of 
restrictions of economic freedoms that are justified with a regard to other fundamental 
                                                 
15  There are also other examples of the unbalancing of carefully calibrated national institutional con-
figurations through EU policies. The macro-management of the economy hinges to a large extent on 
the successful coordination of monetary policies, fiscal policies and wage policies based on collective 
bargaining agreements (Scharpf 1984). If one of these elements – monetary policy - is shifted to the 
supranational level, while the others remain national, the task of coordination becomes much more 
difficult (see also Lepsius 1993b on the importance of historically grown and equilibrated institu-
tional configurations).  
16  The 27 judges are nominated by the governments of the Member States. The national nominations are 
then ratified by all member states. The fact that each member state appoints only one judge means 
that in contrast to the Council or the Parliament, country representation on the Court is not weighed 
by country size. 
17  The President of the Court who is elected from and by the judges for a renewable term of three years 
assigns cases to the specific chambers. Since only the outcome of the vote is published as a collegial 
decision, external observers have no knowledge about dissenting opinions, the concrete vote of indi-
vidual judges or the unanimity or non-unanimity of the decision. 
What – if anything – is undermining the European Social Model? 
 
 Page 26
rights or to an overriding national public interest against the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty and the obligations imposed by Community law. The general pattern of the 
judgments is then very similar. As exemplified by the Watts case, the Court first de-
clares that various aspects of common national practice such as requesting prior authori-
sation to medical visits abroad constitute limitations of the economic freedom to pro-
vide services. In a second step it then argues that such demands may nevertheless be 
legitimate in the light of certain overriding legitimate reasons such as the financial bal-
ance of domestic social security systems or the need for planning in hospital services. In 
a third step, it then weighs if the national restrictions are both necessary and reasonable. 
In a fourth and final step, it then usually – but not always – rules that the national con-
cerns do not warrant restrictions of the economic freedoms guaranteed in the Treaties. 
The Laval and Viking judgments on labour relations followed a similar pattern. First 
the Court recognised “that the right to take collective action for the protection of the 
workers of the host State against possible social dumping may constitute an overriding 
reason of public interest” (...) “which, in principle, justifies a restriction of one of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty” (Laval, paragraph 103), but then it 
determined that “the exercise of that right may none the less be subject to certain restric-
tions” (Viking, paragraph 44), as it “must be reconciled with the requirements relating to 
rights protected under the Treaty and in accordance with the principle of proportional-
ity.” (Ibid., Summary, paragraph 2).  
Even though the Court judgments always make ample reference to previous cases, 
the specific weighing of the proportionality of opposing principles leaves a margin for 
discretion of which differently composed chambers make different use. Hence there are 
also judgments in which the Court recognised the legitimacy of national restrictions. In 
issues pertaining to labour relations, the Court typically accepts the binding character of 
domestic wage levels that are based on universally applicable minimum wage legisla-
tion. The judgment in the Mazzoleni case – C-165/98 – is a good case in point. The 
Court ruled “that Community law does not preclude a Member State from requiring an 
undertaking established in another Member State which provides services in the terri-
tory of the first State to pay its workers the minimum remuneration fixed by the national 
rules of that State.” (Paragraph 29 and Summary) Hence the Court left it “for the com-
petent authorities of the host Member State to establish whether, and if so to what ex-
tent, application of national rules imposing a minimum wage on such an undertaking is 
necessary and proportionate in order to ensure the protection of the workers concerned.” 
(Paragraph 41)18 In the joined cases Arblade (C-369/96) and Leloup (C-376/96), the 
                                                 
18  In the joined cases Finalarte and others (C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-
71/98), the Court similarly ruled that the relevant Treaty articles “do not preclude a Member State 
from imposing national rules guaranteeing entitlement to paid leave for posted workers on a business 
in the construction industry established in another Member State (…) on the two-fold condition that: 
(i) the workers do not enjoy an essentially similar level of protection under the law of the Member 
State where their employer is established (…) and (ii) the application of those rules by the first Mem-
ber State is proportionate to the public interest objective pursued.” (Summary, paragraph 1). 
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Court furthermore specified that the relevant Treaty articles “do not preclude a Member 
State from requiring an undertaking established in another Member State (…) to pay the 
workers deployed by it the minimum remuneration fixed by the collective labour 
agreement applicable in the first Member State, provided that the provisions in ques-
tions are sufficiently precise and accessible (...)” (Summary, paragraph 1).19  
In the Schmidberger case (C-112/00) the court had to decide if a demonstration 
blocking the Brenner highway in order to protest against excessive pollution should be 
considered a restriction of the free trade of goods among Member States. It ruled that 
the Austrian authorities were entitled to permit the demonstration, because even the 
complete closure of a major transit route between Member States may be compatible 
with EU law provided that that restriction “is justified by the legitimate interest in the 
protection of fundamental rights, in this case the protesters’ freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly, which applies both to the Community and the Member States.” 
(Summary, paragraph 2)  
With respect to the access of Union citizens to social benefits in other Member 
States, the Court has recurrently accepted national requirements that make the entitle-
ment conditional upon a certain length of stay or a certain level of integration into the 
host country. In the Collins case (C-138/02), the Court ruled against the claim of an 
Irish citizen residing in the United Kingdom that the Treaty does not preclude national 
legislation which makes entitlement to a jobseeker’s allowance conditional on a resi-
dence requirement based on considerations “that are independent of the nationality of 
the persons concerned and proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provi-
sions.” (Summary, paragraph 3). In the Bidar case (C-209/03) relating to a French stu-
dent claiming student support in the UK, the Court similarly ruled that “in the case of 
assistance covering the maintenance costs of students, it is thus legitimate for a Member 
State to grant such assistance only to students who have demonstrated a certain degree 
of integration into the society of that State.” (paragraph 57) It specified, however, that 
“the existence of a certain degree of integration may be regarded as established by find-
ing that the student in question has resided in the host Member State for a certain length 
of time.” (Paragraph 59) In the Förster case ( C-158/07) relating to a German student 
claiming support in the Netherlands, the Court specified that it is legitimate for a Mem-
ber State to make eligibility conditional upon five years’ continuous residence in the 
host country (paragraph 54).20  
                                                 
19  It precluded, however, that such an employer be required – “even by way of public-order legislation” 
- to pay employer’s contributions to the host country’s social security system if it pays such contribu-
tions already in its home country, and to demand labour documents for each worker if such docu-
ments are already kept in the home country (Summary, paragraphs 2 and 3). 
20  The Sodemare case (C-70/95) is another example of a ruling upholding the legitimacy of national 
provision. Here the Court ruled in 1997 that a Member State (in this case Italy) may make the admis-
sion of private providers of social welfare services subject to the condition that they are non-profit-
making (and may hence deny access to a provider from Luxembourg). 
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In sum, then, the Court does not always rule in favour of individual entitlements over 
national concerns. Much depends upon the specifics of the case and apparently also on 
the way in which national actions or regulations were specifically framed. As long as 
legislative acts or administrative actions make no difference between national citizens 
and Union citizens from other Member States, the risk that the Court will strike them 
down is smaller than in cases which are easily defined as discriminating between na-
tionals and other EU-citizens. One of the consequences of this is that collective actors 
such as trade unions planning a strike cannot afford any longer to do without the advice 
of lawyers who are experts in European law.  
The fifth criticism, finally, is that despite all inconsistency, the Court’s rulings do 
not affect all national institutions similarly in a neutral fashion, but are biased against 
peculiar national arrangements such as collective bargaining agreements or collectively 
financed public services providing benefits in kind for free (Höpner und Schäfer 2008a, 
2008b; Höpner 2008; Höpner 2010; Scharpf 2009b, 2009c). In this sense, the Court in-
voluntarily exerts pressure on national governments to shift to institutions which are 
better compatible with European law. In the field of labour relations, for example, 
minimum wage legislation clearly has better chances to be respected by the Court than 
minimum rates based on collective agreements which dominate in Scandinavia and 
Germany. In the field of public health services, reimbursement schemes are better suited 
to cope with Court judgments granting all citizens access to services in other Member 
States than a public health service granting benefits free of charge at the point of deliv-
ery such as the British NHS. Similarly, education systems that want to provide higher 
education as a public service free of charge are less compatible with the free movement 
of students than systems that demand tuition fees. The Court rulings thus imply pres-
sures for convergence even in policy fields where current EU law only provides for the 
soft and flexible open method of coordination.  
As most of the Court’s judgments are in favour of de-regulation, the Court’s role fre-
quently amounts to initiating what Maurizio Ferrera once called “the gloomy spiral” of 
“national de-structuring without supra-national restructuring” (Ferrera 2005a: 252; see 
also Höpner and Schäfer 2008b). The question then is what chances there are to stop 
and possibly reverse this process of de-structuring. Basically, there are two possibilities: 
Either the EU attains more social competences at the supranational level, or individual 
nation-states regain some of their rights. In the final section, I will discuss the prospects 
for either solution.  
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4. Future prospects 
a)  The impact of the present financial crisis 
The financial crisis has thoroughly weakened the position of those who advocate de-
regulation as the most promising path to future growth and prosperity. Hence, defenders 
of the idea of a European Social Model are less on the defensive now than they were 
over the past two decades, and under the scrutiny of the European Parliament the new 
Commission may prove less favourable to de-regulation than its predecessors. This does 
not mean, however, that the prospects for a supranational restructuring of the welfare 
state have brightened. Policy learning and soft regulation through the open method of 
coordination will probably continue, but the prospects for a hard and binding European 
social legislation have not really improved. There a three rather tight limits to hard law 
harmonizing European social policies in a way that could strengthen the “plus” side in 
the interpretation of the European social model as a “USA plus”.   
b) The triple limits to effective supranational social policies in the EU 
The first limit relates to the heterogeneity of national interests and to the dilemma of EU 
decision making. Redistribution requires legitimation. But on the European level, the 
Eastern enlargement has even increased the heterogeneity of national interests so that 
consensual decisions are very hard to reach. National laws seeking to guarantee mini-
mum wages or high level of social benefits for all workers also have the effect of block-
ing workers from low wage countries who are in search of a job and would be willing to 
work for less pay that is still more than they would earn at home. Hence regulations that 
would be equally satisfying to both sides are hard to find. Majority decisions, on the 
other hand, would lack legitimation, because they would even be binding for those na-
tional governments which had voted against the initiative in the Council and in so doing 
had relied upon the support of their national voters. This dilemma makes a supra-
national restructuring of social policies on the European level unlikely and leads to the 
priority of negative over positive integration as analyzed by Fritz Scharpf (1996; 1999; 
2009b, 2009c).  
The second limit has to do with the lack of fiscal resources. Compared to national 
states which have public expenditure ratios in the range of one third to one half of GDP, 
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the EU has only a tiny budget that is limited to 1.24 % of GDP.21 As the financial crisis 
has considerably tightened the fiscal squeeze, it seems very unlikely that national gov-
ernments might be willing to grant more revenues to the EU. 
The third limit has to do with the unwillingness of EU citizens to extend their notions 
of solidarity beyond national boundaries. It is true that European citizens by now have 
European or trans-national standards of comparison when judging their own living con-
ditions. This is indicated by the fact that even those in the highest income quartiles of 
poorer European countries have lower life satisfaction scores than those in the lowest 
income quartile of rich Member States (figure 9). However, Europeans continue to have 
national mind-sets in a triple sense: Their collective identity continues to be framed in 
national, not supranational terms, their concept of solidarity ends at the borders of the 
nation-state, and they want to allocate decision-making on social policy issues on the 
national rather than on the European level.  
In 2004, Eurobarometer 62 asked Europeans about their perceived collective identity 
and about their perception of the EU. For the survey question “In the near future do you 
see yourself as …”, the results were as follows: 
- Nationality (e.g. Italian) only: around 40 % 
- Nationality and European: around 45 %   
- European and Nationality: below   10 % 
- European only:   around    3 %  
The percentage of Europeans considering the EU membership “a good thing” decreased 
by almost 20 percentage points from 72 % in the Eurobarometers of the early 1990s to 
53 % in autumn 2006. In Eurobarometer 66 of autumn 2006, the percentage of respon-
dents opposing further enlargements was practically as high as the percentage of propo-
nents (42 % as compared to 46 %).22 
The extent to which Europeans continue to have national concepts of solidarity can 
be measured on the basis of a question in the European Values Survey 1999/2000 which 
asked: “When jobs are scarce employers should give priority to people in (home coun-
try).” The result was sobering for those who deride the concept of nation-states as repre-
senting an obsolete “container model” of European societies  
- There are only 4 European Member States where more than half of the respondents 
disagree with this statement (SW, DK, NL, LU) 
-  In 10 of the EU-15 countries there is a two thirds majority in favour of discrimination 
                                                 
21  In absolute terms, the EU budget is less than one half the size of the German central government 
budget which in turn claims only about 30 % of the total outlays of public authorities in Germany 
(EU budget 2007: 126.5 bio  – German federal government 303.175 bio. - Statistisches Jahrbuch für 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008: 570). 
22  This is based on analyses of Standard Eurobarometer 56 (Autumn 2001), Standard Eurobarometer 62 
(Autumn 2004), and Standard Eurobarometer 66 (Autumn 2006) carried out by Florian Fliegner.  
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- In 10 of the New Member States there are even larger majorities in favour of dis-
crimination, as less than 20 % reject the statement. In the Czech Republic this minor-
ity counted only 11 %, and Estonia is the only exception with a rejection rate of 48 % 
(based on Gerhards and Hölscher 2005; Gerhards 2007). 
 
 
Figure  9: Life Satisfaction by income quartiles in European countries, 2009 
Countries ranked by GDP per capita (EU27 = 100)
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
LU IE NL AT DK SE FI DE GB BE EU15 FR ES IT EU27 CY GR SI CZ MT PT SK EE HU LT LV PL RO BG
276 135 134 124 120 120 117 116 116 115 111 108 103 102 100 96 94 91 80 76 76 72 67 64 62 57 56 42 41
Li
fe
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
(s
ca
le
 fr
om
 1
 "
di
ss
at
is
fie
d"
 to
 1
0 
"v
er
y 
sa
tis
fie
d"
)
highest quartile
3rd quartile
2nd quartile
lowest quartile
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Finally, Europeans continue to have a strong preference for national decision making on 
social policy issues. The European Social Survey 2002 asked: “Policies can be decided 
at different levels. Using this card, at which level do you think the following policies 
should mainly be decided?“ For “social welfare” the answers were distributed as fol-
lows:  
- National level: This is the preferred solution of Europeans for which almost two 
thirds – 61 % – opt. The national range is from 45 % in Italy to 76 % in the Czech 
Republic. 
- European Level: This ranks second, preferred, however, only by a small minority of 
15 %; the national range is from 7 % in Poland to 24 % in Spain and Germany. 
- Regional or local level: This is preferred by 14 % of Europeans, with a range from 
5 % in Germany to 35 % in Poland. 
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- International level: This is only preferred by a small minority of 10 %, with a range 
from 3 % in Ireland to 20 % in Spain.23  
The fact is, then, that the European elites lack consensus and that European citizens shy 
away from empowering the EU in social policies. The question then remains what can 
realistically be done in order to avoid the “gloomy spiral” of de-structuring without re-
structuring. In the concluding section I want to look at three proposals, the third of 
which is currently debated intensively in Germany and may be particularly interesting 
from a Czech perspective given the recent ratification debate.  
c)  Three realistic reform proposals  
The first proposal relates to the level of the EU and is a fairly modest and conventional 
one. It has been made by Tony Blair during the British Presidency and it is frequently 
re-iterated by policy consultants such as Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Maurizio Ferrera, An-
thony Giddens, or Anton Hemerijck, so that progress is already well under way and now 
partly enshrined in the Commission’s new agenda for Europe 202024: Shift the EU 
budget emphasis from support for declining sectors of the past to the knowledge econ-
omy of the future; invest more in human resources with a focus on children.25 There is 
also a more specific and perhaps even more important element, however, which con-
cerns second generation immigrants. One of the great failures of European societies is 
the comparatively weak integration of immigrant children into the educational system 
and into national labour markets. In economic terms Europe thus wastes and neglects a 
huge amount of human capital, in sociological terms Europe runs the risk of producing 
an underclass with severely hampered chances of integration into labour markets and 
into the host culture. This is one of the fields in which the U.S. does better than many 
European countries including the biggest European nation in terms of population size, 
                                                 
23  I owe these data to a courtesy of Richard Rose who analysed question B35-42 in the European Social 
Survey 2002 and shared the results with me. 
24  The major goals of Europe 2020 are: (1) Raise the employment rate of the population aged 20-64 
from the current 69 %  to at least 75 % ; (2) achieve the target of investing 3 %  of GDP in R&D in 
particular by improving the conditions for R&D investment by the private sector, and develop a new 
indicator to track innovation; (3) reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20 %  compared to 
1990 levels or by 30 %  if the conditions are right, increase the share of renewable energy in our final 
energy consumption to 20 % , and achieve a 20 %  increase in energy efficiency; (4) reduce the share 
of early school leavers to 10 %  from the current 15 %  and increase the share of the population aged 
30-34 having completed tertiary education from 31 %  to at least 40 % ; (5) reduce the number of 
Europeans living below national poverty lines by 25 % , lifting 20 million people out of poverty 
(European Commission 2010).  
25  Ferrera (2005b: 19) was one of the first to pointed out the absence of children in any of the objectives 
that guide the open coordination process.   
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Germany, where the situation is particularly dismal, as the second generation of immi-
grants fares even worse than the first one (figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Mean scores in reading performance of 15-year old students by immigrant status
OECD countries, 2003*
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Source: based on OECD PISA-Study 2003 online database.
*Order by difference native minus first generation students  
A second proposal also relates to the European level and refers to the improvement of 
legislation and of soft law by further developing and extending the range of social 
monitoring processes. This has just been proposed by the European Parliament in its 
inter-organizational accord found with the Commission in the course of the quarrels 
over the election of the new Barroso Commission. Already now, the open method of 
coordination relies on the setting of certain social benchmarks and on comparing to 
what extent the member countries meet them or at least approximate meeting them. 
Thus we now have the 18 Laeken indicators tapping the degree of income poverty, of 
income inequality, of unemployment and of ill health, and of insufficient schooling or 
educational poverty. For employment we have the targets of the Lisbon and Stockholm 
Councils, for education we have the five benchmarks setting the goals to be achieved by 
2010, and now also the new goals defined in the agenda for Europe 2020.26   
                                                 
26  Two promising further attempts towards a monitoring of progress in the social dimension already 
exist: The European Quality of Life Survey of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Liv-
ing and Working Conditions in Dublin (2003 and 2007 – for analyses see Alber/Fahey/Saraceno 
2008), and the monitoring of good governance in the Quality of Government Institute at Gothenborg 
University in Sweden which received last year’s award of the American Political Science Association 
for the best comparative data set in political science. 
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As now proposed by the European Parliament and agreed upon by the Commission, 
these reviews of specific policies should be developed to a much broader monitoring of 
the likely social impact of EU legislation and of the progress the EU makes in terms of 
fulfilling its goals. Social monitoring attempts assessing the social consequences of 
European law might be developed not only by national governments or parliaments, but 
also on the associational level by the social partners (Jobelius 2007). I think such at-
tempts should include a European statistical minimum, set for example at 40 % of the 
European median, and used only for purposes of social reporting, similar to the Ameri-
can federal poverty standard.27 Such a unified statistical poverty measure would be 
preferable to the at risk of poverty rate which is used by Eurostat and set at 60 % of the 
national median equivalent income, because this seemingly identical poverty threshold 
is actually set at a level which is roughly seven times higher in Luxembourg than in 
poorer new Member States. Such a measure could also reconcile regional and social 
policy procedures in the EU (Fahey 2007). In a similar, but more binding form going 
beyond mere statistical information, Fritz Scharpf (Scharpf 2009d: 8) has advocated a 
national commitment to wages that do not fall below a joint relative poverty level which 
would be set at the same relative level, but be calculated with reference to the national 
mean or median. In essence the result of such social monitoring processes would be a 
higher awareness of the social consequences of EU legislation and a naming and sham-
ing process, where the enhanced visibility of national shortcomings might contribute to 
weakening social dumping tendencies and to enhancing positive catch-up pressures that 
are rooted in the need to gain the democratic consent of voters who increasingly develop 
European standards of comparison.  
A third proposal implies a stronger departure from past EU practice, as it advocates 
re-strengthening the role of national parliaments and governments. The new approach is 
already enshrined in the new Lisbon Treaty – where Article 5 TEU stresses limits of EU 
legislative powers, while Protocols 1 and 2 outline the stronger involvement of national 
parliaments in EU law making, and define the application of the principles of subsidiar-
ity and proportionality (see below). Limits of EU competences are even stressed further 
in the 2009 ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the compatibility of the ratifi-
cation of the Lisbon Treaty with the German constitution.28 
In its 2009 judgment, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
declared the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty to be compatible with the German consti-
tution, but it made several reservations which must be considered binding for Germany 
and which all amount to strengthening the role of national parliaments in EU law mak-
                                                 
27  This standard is merely used for statistical purposes in the U.S. and has nothing to do with the much 
lower benefit rates under the social assistance scheme (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families – 
see Alber 2010). 
28  For a contrasting view see Wickham (2002) who is concerned about the future of the European Social 
Model, when he characterizes EU policies as follows: “Instead of an ‘ever closer union of peoples’ 
we are offered merely an ‘ever greater market’”, but adds that “in this situation the last thing we need 
is ‘subsidiarity’.”  
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ing. The German court considers the European Union a union of states which does not 
yet represent a united people of European citizens, but only the various peoples of 
European countries, constituted as citizens of separate nation states (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht 2009/BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 paragraphs 286, 346). In contrast to Article 10 
TEU which states somewhat ambiguously that “Citizens are directly represented at Un-
ion level in the European Parliament”, other Treaty Articles clearly point to the derived 
nature of Union citizenship which follows especially from two facts: (1) Single states 
have the right to leave the EU, and to take their citizens with them (Article 50 TEU). (2) 
Based on the principle of “degressive proportionality”, representation is made contin-
gent upon the nation-specific population size so that individual Member States are rep-
resented by a minimum of six, but a maximum of 96 members (Article 14 TEU).29  
Second, in the opinion of the German Court, EU decision-making procedures do not 
meet fully the criteria of democratic accountability and of equal representation accord-
ing to the principle one man one vote (paragraphs 293-296).  
Third, the German Court finds an inherent tension between two opposing principles 
in EU law. The economic concept of a single market based on the four economic free-
doms with the principle of non-discrimination according to nationality does not allow 
making any differences between the single Member States from which persons, goods 
or services originate. In contrast, the political concept of representation takes differ-
ences in the country of origin explicitly into account by making political representation 
degressively proportional, with minimum and maximum thresholds for the representa-
tion of single nation states (paragraph 287).   
Fourth, the German Court recurrently stresses the limited character of EU legislative 
competences which are confined to specific fields for which the Treaties explicitly be-
stow rights under the so-called principles of conferral, of subsidiarity, and of propor-
tionality. Following these principles outlined in Article 5 TEU, the Union shall act only 
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States to attain 
the objectives set out in the Treaties, and in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.  
The German Court draws two major conclusions from its analysis. First it concludes 
that the peoples of the single Member States remain the sole embodiment of the princi-
ples of democratic sovereignty and of political legitimation (paragraph 347). Second it 
concludes that it is up to the national Parliament – and in the last instance to the national 
                                                 
29  These limits imply that the number of citizens represented by a member of the European Parliament 
is very different in the single Member States, being much higher in larger states. Since Germany and 
France have the same number of 96 representatives in parliament, each of their representatives may 
be said to represent about 857.000 EU citizens, whereas a Maltese representative stands for 67.000, 
and a MP from Luxembourg for 83.000 EU citizens (paragraphs 285-287). If proportional representa-
tion were calculated with reference to the national number of citizens in each country the distortions 
would be even bigger. In the European Council the votes of individual countries continue to be 
weighed by country size – varying from 3 in Malta to 29 in the four biggest Member States -, until 
the Treaty of Nice regulations expire in 2017.  
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Constitutional Court – to decide if and to what extent European law becomes the law of 
the land. Hence it ordered the national parliament to play a more active role in future 
European law making and to formally declare its explicit consent with new European 
regulations and directives (paragraph 416).30 The Court furthermore declared that it will 
make its own scrutiny of European law subject upon two basic criteria: a) the ultra vires 
control checking if European law making stays within the bounds of the principle of 
conferral31, b) the identity control checking if the national adoption of European law 
would leave the substantive identity of the German constitution unaltered (paragraphs 
238, 240). In the event that such controls should result in a negative verdict, the Court 
explicitly leaves no doubt that it would consider European law to be inapplicable in 
Germany (paragraph 241), and in this sense it does not accept the doctrine of the pri-
macy of European law enshrined in the judgements of the European Court of Justice.32 
In essence the Court thus calls for a Europeanization of national parliaments in similar 
ways as propagated earlier by sociologists and political scientists such as Rainer Lep-
sius (1993b), Max Haller (2008) or Fritz Scharpf (2009b, 2009c). Especially Lepsius 
was early in propagating the view that an Europeanisation of national Parliaments 
would lead more effectively to a democratisation of EU politics than a de-
nationalisation of the European Parliament (Lepsius 1993b: 285).    
After the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty in the referenda in France and 
the Netherlands (and later in Ireland), the Commission also adopted the view that there 
may be a democratic deficit in EU policy making which should be counteracted by 
strengthening the role of national actors (Commission of the European Communities 
2005). The Lisbon Treaty added the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality which now forms part of the Treaty and empowers na-
tional parliaments not only to be informed about Commission initiatives, but to send a 
reasoned opinion on whether a draft legislative act complies with the principle of sub-
sidiarity. If at least one third of the votes allocated to national parliaments regard a draft 
legislative as non-complying with this principle, the draft must be reviewed. National 
parliaments now also have the right to sue at the Court of Justice on grounds of in-
fringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act.   
Strengthening the role of national parliaments in EU law making may lead to more 
effective controls of the Commission in the decision making process, but it can do little 
to restrain the active role which the European Court of Justice is playing in interpreting 
                                                 
30  Other countries such as Denmark or Sweden have strengthened the role of their national parliaments 
in European decision making already much earlier. 
31  The German version of the Treaty calls this the principle “der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung”. This 
sounds considerably more restrictive than the English “principle of conferral”, as it limits the concept 
twice: by adding the adjective “limited” (begrenzt) and by adding a restricting prefix to the noun, i.e. 
“specific conferral” (Einzelermächtigung). This reminds us that European law does not sound exactly 
identical in all the different languages of the Union. 
32  In my perception, the German Courts’ statements on the primacy of national sovereignty in para-
graphs 238 and 241 are very much in tension with the declarations of the primacy of European law in 
the rulings Van Gend & Loos (C-26/62) and Costa-ENEL (C-6/64) of the European Court of Justice.  
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the laws after they have been passed. Several German lawyers and political scientists 
have concluded that the Court has overstretched its role and has surpassed acceptable 
limits of intervention into national institutional arrangements.33 Furthermore, as shown 
above, its judicial legislation amounted predominantly to strengthen liberalizing and 
deregulatory policies that protect the Treaty based economic freedoms and weaken na-
tionally financed social programmes by opening them to transnational access.34  
To cope with the asymmetry between political and non-political law making, several 
German authors recommend a strategy of politically enforced self-restraint of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, especially in matters which are excluded from the jurisdiction of 
EU legislation under the Treaty (Höpner 2008; Scharpf 2009a; 2009c). Scharpf advo-
cates that national governments should openly declare their non-compliance with spe-
cific judgments which they consider beyond the EU competences (ultra vires) and 
should then couple their refusal with the promise to obey a majority vote in the Euro-
pean Council sustaining the Court’s ruling. According to Scharpf this would transform a 
non-political court decision into a politically deliberate choice (Scharpf 2009a). Scharpf 
concludes that as good Europeans we should stop taking automatic compliance with any 
type of European rule as our criterion of goodness, but should become critical of the 
anti-democratic effects of “integration through non-political judicial legislation”. The 
German debate thus illustrates that resistance against processes of Europeanization need 
not be based on nationalistic concerns about the fading authority of national govern-
ments or nation-states, but may reflect a social democratic concern about the impact of 
citizens as voters, the future of the European Social Model, and the viability of social 
policies that continue to be financed on the national level. 
                                                 
33  In 2008 Roman Herzog, the former President of the German Constitutional Court, published an arti-
cle entitled “Stop the European Court of Justice” in one of the leading German newspapers which 
aroused widespread attention (Herzog and Gerken 2008).  
34  For a more positive assessment of the role of the Court with respect to social rights see Caporaso and 
Tarrow (2009).  
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